

https://About.Me/Terry.Sweetser

Routing Security SIG RPKI Data Results for APAC

APRICOT 2024

APNIC 57
BANGKOK, THAILAND
21 February – 1 March 2024







Boilerplate

- All data captured at 0400Z on February 7, 2024.
- It will be Open Source on GITHUB
 - https://github.com/tcsweetser/bcp185
- Lots of SQL, you get to see inside the Sausage Factory!

bcp185=#	\d+								
List of relations									
Schema	Name	Type	Owner	Persistence	Access method	Size	Description		
public	overlapping_signed_routes	+ materialized view	apnic	+ permanent	+ heap	+ 8344 kB	+ 		
public public	rir_allocations routes	table table	apnic apnic	permanent permanent	heap heap	26 MB 2121 MB			
public (4 rows)	rpki_signed_routes	table	apnic	permanent	heap	34 MB	1		




Data Sources



https://www.routeviews.org/routeviews/

https://ftp.apnic.net/stats/

https://blog.apnic.net/2020/01/29/is-rpki-ready-for-the-big-screen/







Simple Data Structures

```
bcp185=# \d+ rpki_signed_routes
                                       Table "public.rpki signed routes"
                                     Nullable | Default | Storage | Compression | Stats target | Description
   Column
                         Collation |
ASN
                text
                                                           extended
IP Prefix
                cidr
                                                           main
Max Length
                integer
                                                           plain
Trust Anchor
                text
                                                           extended
Expires
               bigint
                                                           plain
Indexes:
    "rpki signed routes ASN idx" btree ("ASN")
    "rpki signed routes IP Prefix idx" gist ("IP Prefix" inet ops)
    "rpki_signed_routes_Trust_Anchor_idx" btree ("Trust_Anchor")
    "rpki signed routes masklen idx" btree (masklen("IP Prefix"::inet))
Access method: heap
```

bcp185=# \d+ routes Table "public.routes"										
Column	Туре	Collation				Compression	Stats target	Description		
dumptype exported protocol nexthop asn prefix aspath origin Indexes: "route Access met	text text character(1) inet bigint cidr text text text text text	ist (prefix	inet_ops)		extended extended extended main plain main extended extended					


Same Basic Numbers

```
bcp185=# select count(*) from rpki_signed_routes;
   count
-----
508414
(1 row)

bcp185=# select count(*) from routes;
   count
-----
18535539
(1 row)
```

```
bcp185=# select family("IP Prefix"),"Trust Anchor",
count(distinct "IP Prefix")
from rpki signed routes
group by \overline{1},2 order by 2,1;
 family | Trust Anchor | count
          afrinic
                            8920
          afrinic
                             647
                           92059
          apnic
          apnic
                           25952
                           74949
          arin
          arin
                           15991
          lacnic
                           21594
          lacnic
                            7915
          ripe
                          174975
                           39003
          ripe
10 rows
```

RPKI in less than 1 minute



ROA, are we there yet?

https://stats.labs.apnic.net/roas


Lots of Green here, but...

AU

PG JP

ΝZ

TH





Progress ©


Use of Route Object Validation for Asia (XD)

Display: Addresses (Advertised ROA-Valid Advertised Addresses), Total (IPv4 + IPv6), Percent (of Total)



Use of Route Object Validation for Oceania (XF)

Display: Addresses (Advertised ROA-Valid Advertised Addresses), Total (IPv4 + IPv6), Percent (of Total)



ROV, how is that going?


https://stats.labs.apnic.net/rpki

Great job by ...

TW AU

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- - -






Validation: A Long Road Ahead

Use of RPKI Validation for Asia (XD)



Use of RPKI Validation for Oceania (XF)





RFC7115 + RFC9319 = BCP185

For this reason, this document recommends that, whenever possible, operators SHOULD use "minimal ROAs" that authorize only those IP prefixes that are actually originated in BGP, and no other prefixes. Further, it recommends ways to reduce the forged-origin attack surface by prudently limiting the address space that is included in ROAs. One recommendation is to avoid using the maxLength attribute in ROAs except in some specific cases. The recommendations complement and extend those in [RFC7115]. The document also

- Members of All the RIRs continue to "OVERSIGN"
 - Huge MAX LENGTHS with no matching ROUTES.
 - Largest and most connected economies are the WORST cases.
 - Highly questionable ROAs signed by those who should know better.



The Top 10 ...

```
bcp185=# select * from report bcp185 by iso where
("Global Routes"/"ROA Coverage") < 0.00005
and economy iso\neq'
and "Global Routes" > 10
order by 2 desc;
 economy iso | ROA Coverage | Global Routes | BCP185 Compliance
FR
                                       10450
                                                000.00%
                 1195134656
TW
                  381642809
                                       12649
                                               000.00%
 JP
                  157727426
                                        6087
                                               000.00%
MA
                   33835598
                                         265
                                               000.00%
 AL
                   32638327
                                         927
                                               000.00%
IS
                    4457025
                                         178
                                               000.00%
CD
                    2621515
                                          69
                                               000.00%
 LI
                    2228351
                                               000.00%
                                          66
GD
                    1974818
                                          34
                                                000.00%
GP
                    1180482
                                          25
                                                000.00%
(10 rows)
```



The Top 25 in APAC ...

bcp185=# bcp185=# rir	<pre>select * fror</pre>	m report_bcp185 ROA Coverage	_combined where Global Routes	rir='apnic' order by 3 desc limit 25; BCP185 Compliance
apnic	TW	380463099	12614	000.00%
apnic	JP	155498452	6027	000.00%
apnic	CN	36239128	2153	000.01%
apnic	ID	29810247	17760	000.06%
apnic	IN	4275225	38941	000.91%
apnic	SG	3816797	5844	000.15%
apnic	AU	3468345	7941	000.23%
apnic	VN	2285508	22620	000.99%
apnic	NZ	2105698	1802	000.09%
apnic	HK	2059318	7349	000.36%
apnic	US	1105124	1612	000.15%
apnic	MY	1062999	3108	000.29%
apnic	BD	958449	10300	001.07%
apnic	MN	656210	514	000.08%
apnic	PK	576198	7544	001.31%
apnic	PH	416962	5387	001.29%
apnic	KH	268386	2165	000.81%
apnic	MM	263864	1071	000.41%
apnic	MV	263226	281	000.11%
apnic	NP	139692	1102	000.79%
apnic	MO	132886	113	000.09%
apnic	BT	131854	125	000.09%
apnic	VU	131140	68	000.05%
apnic	TH	117555	6822	005.80%
apnic	LK	85615	743	000.87%
(25 rows	5)			

Good News Everyone!

1 405 " 1			1
		t_bcp185_by_iso ge") > 0.80 and	
order by 3 de		ge / > 0.00 and	cconomy_cso-
economy iso	l ROA Coverage	Global Routes	BCP185 Compliance
economy_tso	Non Coverage		
SY	163	163	100.00%
YE	127	121	095.28%
BW	73	64	087.67%
TJ	46	42	091.30%
GÜ	26	23	088.46%
GL	24	21	087.50%
TM	20	20	1 100.00%
TD	24	20	083.33%
PM	18	18	100.00%
SM	17	16	094.12%
MH	18	15	083.33%
AX	16	15	093.75%
NR	15	14	093.33%
F0	14	13	092.86%
10	12	12	100.00%
CW	13	12	092.31%
DM	j 7	j 7	100.00%
TT	j 7	7	100.00%
AI	j 5	5	100.00%
GG	j 6	5	083.33%
CU	5	5	100.00%
NU	5	5	100.00%
BB	j 4	4	100.00%
VA	2	2	100.00%
VI] 2 1	1	100.00%
(25 rows)			





Overlapping Signed Routes ...

```
bcp185=# select * from overlapping signed routes limit 10;
 asns subnet |
                                  subnet
                                               subnet maxlen
              asns supernet |
                                                                               supernet maxlen
                                                                  supernet
 {AS132215}
               {AS9583}
                               1.6.228.0/24
                                                          24
                                                               1.6.228.0/22
                                                                                            24
 {AS4755}
               {AS9583}
                               1.6.229.0/24
                                                               1.6.228.0/22
                                                                                            24
 {AS132215}
               {AS9583}
                               1.7.142.0/24
                                                               1.7.140.0/22
                                                                                            24
 {AS132215}
               {AS9583}
                               1.7.151.0/24
                                                               1.7.148.0/22
                                                                                            24
 {AS132215}
               {AS9583}
                                                               1.7.160.0/22
                               1.7.161.0/24
                                                          24
                                                                                            24
 {AS132215}
               {AS9583}
                               1.7.162.0/24
                                                          24
                                                               1.7.160.0/22
                                                                                            24
 {AS132215}
               {AS9583}
                               1.7.180.0/24
                                                               1.7.180.0/22
                                                                                            24
 {AS396421}
               {AS9583}
                               1.7.225.0/24
                                                          24
                                                               1.7.224.0/22
                                                                                            24
 {AS4755}
               {AS9583}
                               1.7.229.0/24
                                                               1.7.228.0/22
                                                                                            24
 {AS65037}
               {AS4788}
                               1.9.12.0/24
                                                               1.9.0.0/16
                                                                                            24
10 rows)
bcp185=# select count(*) from overlapping signed routes;
count
63296
1 row)
```



Please Stop Doing ...

Max Max Length IPv4

Max Max Length IPv6

```
bcp185=# select "Trust Anchor",count(distinct "ASN")
from rpki signed routes
where family("IP Prefix")=4 and "Max Length" = 32
group by 1 order by 2 desc;
Trust Anchor | count
ripe
                  572
lacnic
                  281
                  162
arin
                   67
apnic
afrinic
                   20
(5 rows)
```

```
bcp185=# select "Trust Anchor",count(distinct "ASN")
from rpki signed routes
where family("IP Prefix")=6 and "Max Length" = 128
group by 1 order by 2 desc;
Trust Anchor | count
 lacnic
                  276
                  130
 ripe
                   33
 arin
                   28
 apnic
                   15
 afrinic
(5 rows)
```



Please stop doing ...

```
bcp185=# select array agg("ASN") as asns, "IP Prefix" as subnet, "Max Length" as maxlen,
split cidr count("IP Prefix", "Max Length") from rpki signed routes
where family("IP Prefix")=4
group by 2,3 order by 4 desc limit 10;
                                subnet
                                             maxlen | split cidr count
           asns
 {AS21928}
                             100.128.0.0/9
                                                  24
                                                                  65535
 {AS6253}
                             48.0.0.0/9
                                                  24
                                                                  65535
                             3.128.0.0/10
                                                  24
 {AS8987,AS14618,AS16509}
                                                                  32767
 {AS16509,AS8987,AS14618} |
                             44.192.0.0/10
                                                  24
                                                                  32767
 {AS8987,AS14618,AS16509} |
                             3.192.0.0/10
                                                  24
                                                                  32767
 {AS14618,AS8987,AS16509} |
                                                  24
                             3.0.0.0/10
                                                                  32767
 {AS6253}
                             48.128.0.0/10
                                                  24
                                                                  32767
 {AS14618,AS8987,AS16509} |
                             34.192.0.0/10
                                                  24
                                                                  32767
 {AS14618, AS8987, AS16509}
                             3.64.0.0/10
                                                  24
                                                                  32767
 {AS17676}
                             126.64.0.0/10
                                                  24
                                                                  32767
 10 rows)
```

Please explain ...

```
bcp185=#
bcp185=# select * from route rpki subnet counts where subnet \Leftarrow '100.128.0.0/9'::cidr;
          | maxlen | expanded_count | routed_count | rir | economy_iso
   subnet
100.128.0.0/9 | 24 | 65535 | 1 | arin | US
(1 row)
bcp185=# select * from route rpki subnet counts where subnet \Leftarrow '48.0.0.0/9'::cidr;
  subnet | maxlen | expanded count | routed count | rir | economy iso
48.0.0.0/9 | 24 | 65535 | 0 | arin | US
(1 row)
bcp185=# select * from route rpki subnet counts where subnet = '3.0.0.0/10'::cidr;
  subnet | maxlen | expanded count | routed count | rir | economy iso
3.0.0.0/10 | 24 | 32767 | 243 | arin | US
1 row)
```

Wait, there's more ...

ASN	refix" << '2001:c10:: IP Prefix	/32'::cidr or Max Length			"IP H	Prefix" << '2001:c10::/32 IP Prefix		by 3 limit 25 Trust Anchor	
AS7473	2001:c10:8000::/34	34	apnic	 170784	473	2001:c10:80:1::2c0/126 2001:c10:80:1::1f0/126	126 126	apnic	17078 17078
AS7473	2001:c10:4000::/34	34	apnic	170784	473 473	2001:C10:80:1::110/126	126	apnic apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:c000::/35	35	apnic	170784	473 473	2001:c10:80:1::16c/126	126	apric	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:2000::/35	35	apnic	170784	473 473	2001:c10:80:1::164/126	126	apric	17078
AS7473 AS7473	2001:c10:e000::/36	36 36	apnic	170784 170784	473	2001:c10:80:1::144/126	126	apric	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:1000::/36 2001:c10:f000::/37	36 37	apnic	170784	473	2001:c10:80:1::18/126	126	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:1000:./3/ 2001:c10:800::/37	37 37	apnic apnic	170784	473	2001:c10:80:1::e8/120	126	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:800::/37 2001:c10:400::/38	38	apric	170784	473	2001:c10:80:1::5c/126	126	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:400::/38 2001:c10:200::/39	39	apric	170784	473	2001:c10:80:1::3c/126	126	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:200::/39 2001:c10:fc00::/39	39	apric	170784	473	2001:c10:0:1::20/126	126	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:100::/33	40	apnic	170784	473	2001:c10:0:1::60/127	127	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:fe00::/40	40	apnic	170784	473	2001:c10:0:1::30,12,	127	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:f680::/41	41	apnic	170784	473	2001:c10:0:1::136/128	128	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:c0::/42	42	apnic	170784	473	2001:c10:0:1::132/128	128	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:40::/42	42	apnic	170784	473	2001:c10:0:1::122/128	128	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:ff40::/42	42	apnic	170784	473	2001:c10:0:1::115/128	128	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:a0::/43	43	apnic	170784	473	2001:c10:0:1::63/128	128	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:20::/43	43	apnic	170784	473	2001:c10:0:1::103/128	128	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:ff20::/43	43	apnic	170784	473	2001:c10:0:1::62/128	128	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:10::/44	44	apnic	170784	473	2001:c10:0:1::57/128	128	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:90::/44	44	apnic	170784	473	2001:c10:0:1::16/128	128	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:ff10::/44	44	apnic	170784	473	2001:c10:0:1::60/128	128	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:8::/45	45	apnic	170784	473	2001:c10:0:1::33/128	128	apnic	17078
AS7473	2001:c10:88::/45	45	apnic	170784	473	2001:c10:0:1::24/128	128	apnic	17078

One Billion Routes!

bcp185=# select array agg("ASN") as asns, "IP Prefix" as subnet, "Max Length" as maxlen, split cidr count("IP Prefix", "Max Length") from rpki signed routes group by 2,3 order by 4 desc limit 25; maxlen | split cidr count subnet asns {AS5511} 2a01:c000::/19 48 1073741823 {AS26810} 48 2601:9000::/20 536870911 {AS7303} 2800:2000::/20 48 536870911 {AS3462} 2001:b000::/21 48 268435455 {AS3462} 2001:b000::/23 64 67108863 {AS17676} 2400:2100::/24 48 33554431 {AS8987,AS14618,AS16509} 240f:8000::/24 48 33554431 {AS17676} 2403:9900::/24 48 33554431 {AS6939} 2600:7000::/24 48 33554431 {AS8987,AS14618,AS16509} 2600:1f00::/24 48 33554431 {AS8987,AS14618,AS16509} 2406:da00::/24 48 33554431 {AS17676} 2400:2200::/24 48 33554431 {AS17676} 2400:2300::/24 48 33554431 {AS7155} 2600:6800::/24 64 33554431 {AS14618,AS8987,AS16509} 2600:f000::/24 48 33554431 {AS36925} 2c0e:6000::/24 48 33554431 {AS14618,AS8987,AS16509} 2a05:d000::/25 48 16777215 {AS22927} 2802:8000::/25 48 16777215 {AS15557,AS198949} 2a02:8400::/25 48 16777215 {AS3215} 2a01:cb00::/26 48 8388607 {AS51964} 2a01:ce80::/26 48 8388607 {AS4780,AS9919} 2401:8000::/26 48 8388607 {AS17709} 2404::/26 48 8388607 {AS4780} 2001:4580::/26 48 8388607 {AS43754} 2a05:1a00::/26 128 8388607 (25 rows)



What is MY ASK here?



- Sign your routes, but limit that to only what you advertise to the Global Internet.
- Don't use Public Sources of data for bizarre and non-sensical experiments.
- Don't know? Ask!





https://About.Me/Terry.Sweetser

Questions?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENION